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Obstetricians and Violence Against
Women
Sonya Charles, Cleveland State University
I argue that the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), as an organization and through its individual members, can and should be a far greater
ally in the prevention of violence against women. Specifically, I argue that we need to pay attention to obstetrical practices that inadvertently contribute to the problem
of violence against women. While intimate partner violence is a complex phenomenon, I focus on the coercive control of women and adherence to oppressive gender
norms. Using physician response to alcohol use during pregnancy and court-ordered medical treatment as examples, I show how some obstetrical practices mirror the
attitudes of abusive men insofar as they try to coercively control women’s behavior through manipulation and violence. To be greater allies in the prevention of violence
against women, obstetricians should stop participating in practices that inadvertently perpetuate violence against women.
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The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists (ACOG) has been working to address violence against
women for a number of years. Its primary response is to
educate physicians and encourage screening and interven-
tion. It dedicates an entire section of the organization’s
website to the problem of violence against women (Ameri-
can Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 2010), and
the section includes educational materials (such as statistics
about violence and a slideshow that specifically addresses
the problem of violence during pregnancy), resources (e.g.,
groups working to end violence against women, support
resources for victims of abuse), and screening tools. For at
least 10 years, ACOG has advocated for physicians to rou-
tinely screen all their patients for the risk of violence and
offer appropriate intervention strategieswhen suchpatients
are identified.
While these are laudable goals and efforts, I argue that
ACOG (as an organization and through its individualmem-
bers) can and should be a far greater ally in the prevention of
violence against women.1 Specifically, I argue that we need
to pay attention to other obstetrical practices that inadver-
tently contribute to the problem of violence against women.
In the next section, I take a very brief look at the behaviors
and tactics of abusive men. While intimate partner violence
is a complex phenomenon, I focus on the coercive control of
women and adherence to oppressive gender norms. Using
physician response to alcohol use during pregnancy and
court-ordered medical treatment as examples, I show how
some obstetrical practices mirror the attitudes of abusive
men insofar as they try to coercively control women’s be-
havior through manipulation and violence. To be greater
allies in the prevention of violence against women, obste-
1. Also, studies show that screening and intervention strategies have not been implemented as well as they could be (Chambliss, Bay,
and Jones 1995; Chez and Horan 1999; Frank et al. 2006; Horan et al. 1998; Parsons et al. 1995).
Address correspondence to Sonya Charles, Ph.D., Cleveland State University, Philosophy, 2121 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44115,
USA. E-mail: s.charles07@csuohio.edu
tricians should stop participating in practices that inadver-
tently perpetuate violence against women.
CHARACTERISTICS OF ABUSIVE MEN
Those who research domestic violence note that men who
abuse women generally have patriarchal and misogynis-
tic attitudes toward women and they use these attitudes
to justify their violence against women (van Wormer and
Roberts 2009, 5). For example, consider Julia Hall’s study of
teen boys in Canal Town. The boys considered patriarchal
dominance their birthright and this attitudewas used to jus-
tify violence againstwomen.Here is Robbie commenting on
how he envisions his future family:
I’d like a big house, a wife, and a bunch of kids, I guess. . . . I’ll
be making a lot of money, hopefully, so my wife won’t work.
She’ll take care of the kids, cook, clean. She’ll pick up the pizza
when I order it too. Shewon’t complain too. . . . I wouldn’twant
her to work. . . . She should be home raising the kids. . . . It’s all
part of the contract of being married. . .the wife takes care of
the husband and the husband gets some free time. (Hall 2000,
476)
Later, Robbie uses these same oppressive gender norms
to justify his father abusing his mother:
There’s no priority problems in our house except my dad is
crabby. They [father and mother] will yell for a couple of min-
utes and then quit. . . . He pushes her around a little bit, like if
the house gets messy or the food is burned. . . . My dad apolo-
gizes to her though. He is usually true when he says he’s sorry.
It’s just that she doesn’t always do what she’s supposed to.
(Hall 2000, 478)
Here we see a direct connection between ideals of male
supremacy, control of women, and violence against women.
In Hall’s study of young men with abusive tendencies, this
was a common theme: “As they described family relations,
they elaborated on an ethos of male supremacy and con-
trol as they consistently discussed violence in the home in
the form of men hitting women” (Hall 2000, 478). There-
fore, gender domination and coercive control of women’s
behavior are key factors in intimate partner violence.
In what follows, I explore how some obstetrical prac-
tices also exhibit these characteristics. I readily admit that
most obstetriciansare caringprofessionalswhoaregenuinely
trying to improve women’s health. However, in some ob-
stetrical practices, we see a disturbing likeness to the be-
haviors and tactics of abusive men. Specifically, abusive
men use manipulation, intimidation, and violence to con-
trol women’s behavior (van Wormer and Roberts 2009). In
the next two sections, I show how some obstetrical practices
also usemanipulation, intimidation, and violence to control
women’s behavior. In both cases, these controlling behav-
iors are founded on or rationalized by oppressive gender
norms.
ALCOHOL USE DURING PREGNANCY
In this and the following section, I take amore in-depth look
at two issues—obstetrician response to alcohol use during
pregnancy,2 and the continuing problem of forced medical
treatment for pregnant women. My argument is that the
attitudes toward pregnant women reflected in these prac-
tices are similar to those of abusive men insofar as they use
manipulation and violence to control women’s behavior.
I believe most obstetricians are caring professionals who
are trying to do what is best for their patients. However,
the obstetrical community needs to consider the implications
of some obstetrical practices. Even though their intentions
are very different from those of abusive men, my claim is
that these obstetrical practices inadvertently perpetuate vi-
olence againstwomen by using coercion to control pregnant
women’s behavior. Thus, these obstetrical practices are dis-
turbingly similar to the behavior of abusive men and should
stop.
While there is much evidence supporting a connection
between alcohol and certain birth anomalies, this connec-
tion is somewhat mysterious.3 Research shows that even
among alcoholic women, only 5% will have a child affected
with fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS). Also, FAS is most com-
mon among populations with other factors that also con-
2. Clearly, other physicians also promote the abstinence-only ap-
proach to alcohol during pregnancy. In fact, pediatricians are often
more dogmatic than obstetricians in relation to this topic. However,
in this article, I only discuss obstetricians’ role in promoting this
view.
3. My argument in this section draws heavily on the work of Eliz-
abeth Armstrong. Her sociological account of shifting attitudes to-
ward pregnant women and alcohol and the creation of fetal alco-
hol syndrome was invaluable (Armstrong 2003). While Armstrong
takes a more nuanced approach, I make a more pointed argument
about the implications of this practice.
tribute to poor birth outcomes, such as poor nutrition, lack
of prenatal care, smoking, and high stress levels (or condi-
tions often associatedwith poverty). Given these discrepan-
cies, researchers are unclear whether alcohol directly causes
anomalies or if it is the way the body breaks down the al-
cohol (some have speculated a genetic connection) or if it
is comorbidity factors that make FAS possible. In addition
to these ambiguities, there is no clear consensus about the
level of alcohol consumption and FAS. While it is true that
no safe amount has been established through scientific re-
search (and given the other factors just listed, any “safe”
amount would probably vary from woman to woman), nu-
merous studies have shown that for most healthy women
light (and probably moderate) drinking will have no effect
on fetal outcomes (Armstrong 2003; Gavaghan 2009).
Despite the ambiguities just outlined, ever since FAS
was established as a legitimate disorder,4 physicians
have recommended complete abstinence for all pregnant
women.5 This abstinence-only approach is paternalistic and
suggests that pregnant women’s behavior should be regu-
lated. In “You Can’t Handle the Truth,” Gavaghan sums it
up this way:
To continue preaching total abstinence because of a fear that
women will misunderstand the truth, or regard a reassuring
message about low-level consumption as a “green light” for
unrestrained overindulgence, is patronising and paternalistic
to a degree that is hard to reconcile with any real respect for au-
tonomy and informed decision-making. (Gavaghan 2009, 303)
Instead of giving women accurate information and al-
lowing them to make an informed decision, obstetricians
intentionally overstate the risks of alcohol use. In other
words, they manipulate women in an attempt to control
their behavior. My principle contention is that by ignoring
the ambiguity surrounding FAS and advocating complete
abstinence for all pregnantwomen, obstetricians try to coer-
cively controlwomen’s behavior through control ofmedical
information and their social authority.
In addition to specific medical advice, ACOG uses its
social authority to reinforce the abstinence-only approach
as a cultural norm. For example, in 2008, ACOG released
a press release in relation to a morning news show that
dared to ask the question: “Can Pregnant Women Drink
Alcohol in Moderation?” In this press release, ACOG reit-
erated the abstinence-only approach, stating that the pro-
gram “has created tremendous confusion among women
about the safety of drinking alcohol during pregnancy.” In
4. The first articles on FAS appeared in 1973 and 1974; however,
given the lax attitudes about alcohol and pregnancy held by ob-
stetricians at the time, it took a number of years and some debate
before FAS was generally acknowledged as a legitimate disorder
(Armstrong 2003).
5. Again I want to emphasize that I am discussing obstetricians as
a profession and how they have shaped public attitudes and policy
through the creation of this disease. The attitudes of individual
obstetricians vary greatly. Many individual practitioners remain
more agnostic about alcohol during pregnancy and continue to
simply encourage moderation.
response, ACOG “strongly urges women not to ignore the
public health warnings associated with consuming alcohol
while pregnant” (American Congress of Gynecologists and
Obstetricians 2008). Here ACOG as an organization is using
its social authority to reinforce its paternalistic stance on
alcohol use during pregnancy. By using its social authority
in this way, ACOG is doing two things. First, it is trying
to control the information women receive by attempting
to discredit any dissenting information. Second, it is using
intimidation (i.e., using its social authority) to help create
norms that conform to its view.
Thus, in the abstinence-only campaign, we see parallels
to the tactics used by abusive men. Abusive men expect
women to accept their authority and resist challenges to that
authority. Abusive men also resent the input of outsiders
they see as “on the side of” the partner (i.e., the partner’s
family and friends). As such, they often work to isolate the
woman from those support networks or dissenting opinions
(Goodrum, Umberson, and Anderson 2001). Here we see
ACOG expecting women to not question their stance on
this issue and trying to silence or discredit those who do.
Furthermore, this practice of promoting complete absti-
nence for all pregnant women is based more on oppressive
gender norms than on sound empirical evidence. In “Risk
and the Pregnant Body,” Lyerly and her colleagues show
howphysicians have a tendency to overstate fetal risk (even
in opposition to reassuring empirical evidence)when the in-
tervention is for the benefit of the mother, but the tendency
is to understate fetal risk when the intervention is for the
benefit of the fetus or a male partner.
The idea of imposing any risk on the fetus, however small or
theoretical, for the benefit of the pregnantwoman’s interest has
become anathema. A second cup of coffee, the occasional beer,
themedication that treats awoman’s severe allergies but brings
a slight increase in the risk of cleft palate, the particular SSRI
that best treats a woman’s severe recalcitrant anxiety disorder
but brings a small chance of heart defects—all are off limits, or
nearly so, to a “good mother.” (Lyerly et al. 2009, 40, emphasis
in original)
We do not require the same level of self-sacrifice or vigi-
lance frommen. For example, there is some reason to believe
that sexual intercourse while pregnant could pose a risk to
the pregnancy/fetus, but the empirical evidence is ambigu-
ous as to the nature of this risk. Despite this potential risk
and lack of information, “Most Web sites and doctors reas-
sure that intercourse is safe during pregnancy and advise
women to go ahead if they are so inclined” (Lyerly et al.
2009, 40). So, women must not take any risk—no matter
how small or unsupported—for their pleasure or comfort,
but when the question is one of men’s pleasure, the risks
are ignored or women are encouraged to take them.6
6. Clearly this assumes a heterosexual relationship; however, since
Lyerly and her colleagues discuss this in relation to heterosexual
couples, I do aswell.Also, at least someof thepotential risk assumes
heterosexual relations (e.g., prostaglandins in sperm).
By comparing attitudes toward paternal versus mater-
nal risk, we see how the abstinence-only campaign is based
more on problematic gender norms than sound empirical
evidence. Specifically, obstetricians try to coercewomen into
fulfilling the role of the “good mother.” “Good” mothers
will sacrifice anything for their fetus/baby/children while
“bad” mothers selfishly indulge in their own pursuits.7 In
this way, the practice of promoting complete abstinence for
all pregnant women is part of a web of clinical practices
built on oppressive gender norms.
In sum, my argument is that obstetrician response to
alcohol use during pregnancy shows a disturbing likeness
to the behaviors and tactics of abusive men. Obstetricians
try to coercively control women’s behavior through manip-
ulation (i.e., controlling and misconstruing the information
women receive) and intimidation (i.e., using their social au-
thority to silence dissent and make their view the norm).
Also, we see this obstetrical practice is based more on op-
pressive gender norms than sound empirical evidence. In
this way, it parallels the attitudes toward women expressed
by abusive men concerning women’s proper role or place.
COURT-ORDERED MEDICAL TREATMENT
In the case of alcohol use during pregnancy, physicians ma-
nipulate information in an attempt to control women’s be-
havior. In the case of court-ordered medical treatment, ob-
stetricians use the power of the state to keep women under
medical surveillance and/or perform medical treatments
on behalf of the fetus against the woman’s wishes.8 In this
section, I show how this behavior also bears a disturbing
likeness to the behavior of abusive men. In fact, I argue
that forced medical treatment is a form of violence against
women.9
Officially, ACOG supports a pregnant woman’s right to
refuse medical treatment and does not support the use of
court-ordered medical interventions.
Pregnantwomen’s autonomous decisions should be respected.
Concerns about the impact of maternal decisions on fetal
well-being should be discussed in the context of medical ev-
idence and understood within the context of each woman’s
broad social network, cultural beliefs, and values. In the ab-
sence of extraordinary circumstances, circumstances that, in
fact, the Committee on Ethics cannot currently imagine, judicial
authority should not be used to implement treatment regi-
mens aimed at protecting the fetus, for such actions violate the
7. For a recent analysis of the “good mother” narrative in relation
to clinical and social practices, see Kukla (2008).
8. The physician in these cases is usually an obstetrician, but not
always. For example, in the well-known Angela Carder case it was
the hospital administratorswho invoked judicial authority (Daniels
1993). However, most research on court-orderedmedical treatment
focuses on obstetricians and their attitudes; thus, I too emphasize
the obstetrician’s role.
9. I am not the first to make this argument. For example, Nancy
Rhoden takes a similar position: “The court has authorized an act
of violence against the woman, even if the violence is obscured by
her cowed compliance in the face of judicial power” (Rhoden 1987).
pregnant woman’s autonomy. (ACOG Committee on Ethics 2005,
9, emphasis added)
Despite this strong statement in favor of maternal
choice, court orders are still being sought and implemented.
In March 2009, Samantha Burton was 25 weeks preg-
nant. After admission to Tallahassee Memorial Hospital
with ruptured membranes and signs of premature labor,
Dr. Jana Bures-Forsthoefel, her obstetrician, recommended
Burton remain in the hospital on bed rest for the remainder
of her pregnancy. Burton wanted to leave the hospital and
seek a second opinion. Instead, her obstetrician alerted the
StateAttorney and a hasty court hearingwas convened. The
judge ordered Ms. Burton to remain in the hospital and to
comply with any procedures (including a cesarean) that her
physician thought necessary to protect the health and life of
the fetus. Three days later, Dr. Bures-Forsthoefel performed
a cesarean onMs. Burton that resulted in a stillbirth (Kaczor
2010).10
I appreciate thedilemma facedbya caringobstetrician.11
Let’s take the case of a court-ordered cesareandelivery.Here
we have a woman in the middle of delivering a viable (and
usually full-term) fetus. The obstetrician identifies a med-
ical indication that poses a significant risk to this almost
born child and possibly the mother as well. The obstetri-
cian (relying on his or her professional skills) believes he
or she can alleviate or at least significantly lessen this risk
by performing an immediate cesarean. In this way, the ob-
stetrician experiences moral distress—”knowing” the right
thing to do, but not being able to do it.12 While I appreciate
the angst an obstetrician in this situation might feel, once
the obstetrician crosses the line from informing and encour-
aging to trying to force a woman to comply, then he or
she is also expressing misogynistic attitudes that ultimately
lead to violence against women (i.e., performing medical
treatment against the woman’s wishes).
It is well established that surgery without consent is
a form of battery and assault—and cesareans are no ex-
ception. Similarly, the courts have argued in other cases
that person A cannot be forced to undergo medical treat-
ment for the sake of person B even if person B’s life is at
10. Even though this case was overturned on appeal, it did not
spare Ms. Burton the indignity of hospital confinement or the vio-
lence of a coerced cesarean. As stated in the appellate court opinion,
“Here, Ms. Burton was involuntarily admitted to the hospital and,
ultimately, required to undergo a cesarean section against her will.
She suffered a significant deprivation of her physical liberty and
personal freedom” (Abrams, David H. for Appellant and McCol-
lum 2010).
11. In addition to the reasons I discuss here, obstetricians (or hospi-
tal administrators) also often pursue court-orders as a preventative
measure because they fear lawsuits. However, as long as the ob-
stetrician has a well-documented refusal of treatment, there is no
reason to fear lawsuits. In fact, some argue that seeking court inter-
vention can increase the possibility of medical mistakes that lead
to lawsuits (Adams, Mahowald, and Gallagher 2003).
12. I use scare quotes here because medical knowledge is fallible
so the obstetrician’s view of the situation may not be accurate.
stake.13 Yet we disregard both of these precedents in the
case of pregnant women. Thus, we are not allowing preg-
nant women the same right to bodily autonomy as other
competent adults. As Nancy Rhoden states in her discus-
sion of these cases, “The court compromises its integrity in
making these orders, because whether it realizes it or not,
it is treating the woman as a means—a vehicle for rescuing
an imperiled fetus—and not as an end in herself” (Rhoden
1987, 122).14 Most research shows that when obstetricians
choose to request court orders, they are acting in the inter-
est of the fetus. I say this for three reasons. First, most of
the rationales given for forced medical treatment (e.g., fetal
distress, diabetic noncompliance, placenta previa) relate to
potential harm to the fetus. Granted, some of these pose a
risk to the woman as well, but we do not force competent
patients to receive treatment even when it is in their best
interests, so the focus appears to be on the fetus. Second,
in most of these court orders, the court temporarily grants
custody of the fetus to the physician, hospital, or a state-
appointed guardian. The new guardian then consents to
treatment in the interest of the fetus. Third, in a 2002 survey
(Adams, Mahowald, and Gallagher 2003), every obstetri-
cian who pursued a court order listed “welfare of the fetus”
as the reason (in cases of placenta previa they also noted
“welfare of the woman”).
Even though these intentionsmay seem benevolent, ob-
stetricians need to realize the malicious effect of the deci-
sion to invoke state authority.15 Court orders to perform
medical interventions are used to override an autonomous
woman’s informed consent.16 The obstetrician believes he
or she knows what choice a woman should make and seeks
the ability to control what the pregnant woman does with
her body. As such, forced cesarean sections (and other in-
vasive procedures) are direct assaults on women’s bodies.
In this way, obstetricians who seek court orders use intim-
idation (i.e., medical authority), power (i.e., a court order
and the threat of coercion that implies), and ultimately
13. The case I am referring to is McFall v. Shrimp as discussed in
“Cesareans and Samaritans” (Rhoden 1987).
14. Not only do obstetricians who request these orders make the
same mistake, but they also commit the mistake of medical hubris.
One of the reasonswe insist on informed consent formedical proce-
dures is because the practice of medicine is as much art as science.
The medical indications that obstetricians are reacting to are based
on statistical calculations of risk and benefit. We can never know
how this particular situation will turn out or whether the physi-
cian has accurately assessed the risk in this case. Indeed, there are
a number of cases where the woman avoids the court-mandated
cesarean and vaginally delivers a healthy baby. For example, Irwin
and Jordon recount two caseswhere a court orderwas issued based
on placenta previa, but the woman vaginally delivered a healthy
baby (Irwin and Jordan 1987).
15. Nancy Rhoden gives an excellent analysis of how good inten-
tions (i.e., fetal protection) can lead to bad legal decisions that erode
women’s autonomy (Rhoden 1987).
16. Most of these cases do not question the woman’s competence.
In fact, if the women were deemed incompetent to make decisions
based on normal clinical practice, the course of action would be
some standard of substitute judgment, not a court order.
violence (i.e., the actual cesarean or other treatment) to con-
trol women.
Thus, we see a parallel between obstetricians who
seek court orders and physically abusive partners. In most
cases of court-ordered treatment, the obstetrician has told
a woman an emergency cesarean is necessary and she has
refused to comply. Often her refusal is accompanied by an
attempt to leave the hospital or otherwise remove herself
from the obstetrician’s control. In response, the obstetrician
seeks state authority to coerce the woman into doing what
the obstetrician wants.17 Compare this scenario to studies
of domestic violence that show abusive men use violence to
control women:
Batterers, more than nonviolent men, feel threatened by chal-
lenges to their authority and views, and they often react to
such threats with violence. (Goodrum, Umberson, and Ander-
son 2001, 232)
From these studies and clinical experience with battered
women, it has been theorized thatmale partners are threatened
by loss of control over the relationship whenwomen announce
their decision to separate, and somemenwill stop at nothing to
regain control, including femicide. (Campbell et al. 2007, 254)
We see a similar attitude in the case of Samantha Bur-
ton. Ms. Burton tried to remove herself from Dr. Bures-
Forsthoefel’s care. Instead of allowing her to do this or to
seek a second opinion, Dr. Bures-Forsthoefel invoked state
power to forceMs. Burton to remain under her control. Ulti-
mately, this state power also allowed Dr. Bures-Forsthoefel
to commit a direct assault on Ms. Burton by performing
surgery on her without consent. In both cases, force is used
to regain control over women.18
In sum, forced cesareans are a direct assault onwomen’s
bodies.Whenever anobstetrician seeks a court order to force
a woman to undergo medical treatment on behalf of her fe-
tus, we have an obstetrician participating in violence against
women. Also, in this case, we can see certain parallels be-
tween the intentions of obstetricians who seek court orders
andabusivemen—namely, usingviolence to controlwomen
and adherence to oppressive gender norms (i.e., women
do not have the same rights to bodily autonomy as men
do).
OBSTETRICIANS AS ALLIES
Let me reiterate that I believe most obstetricians are com-
mitted professionals who genuinely care about women’s
health. However, my argument is that obstetricians need to
17. For a particularly chilling account, see Laura Pemberton’s story
of how she fled the hospital while a court orderwas being obtained,
but later was escorted back to the hospital and forced to undergo a
cesarean (Pemberton 2009).
18. Somemight argue that this case is anomalous becausewehave a
woman obstetrician forcing another woman to undergo treatment.
However, this does not underminemy overall argument that court-
ordered medical treatment is a form of violence against pregnant
women.
reassess some specific obstetrical practices. ACOG recog-
nizes that court-ordered medical treatment is a violation of
women’s autonomy. I have shown that it is not only a viola-
tion of women’s autonomy, but an actual act of violence
against women. As such, ACOG should take a stronger
stand against this practice. Since court orders continue to be
sought and implemented, ACOG should use its authority
to see that obstetricians who participate in violence against
women are properly sanctioned.
While forced medical treatment is the most egregious
obstetrical practice, it is also (thankfully) the most rare. Ob-
stetricians should also reflect on other practices that per-
petuate violence against women in a less blatant way. The
abstinence-only response to alcohol use during pregnancy
is an attempt to coercively control women’s behavior by
manipulation (i.e., control of and misrepresentation of in-
formation) and intimidation (i.e., use of social authority to
silence dissent and make social norms adhere to their posi-
tion). I have also shown how this approach relies more on
oppressive gender norms than empirical evidence. Again,
my argument is that this practice shows a disturbing like-
ness to the behavior and tactics of abusive men insofar as it
uses oppressive gender norms to justify coercive control of
women’s behavior.
My goal in this article is not to vilify the obstetrical com-
munity, but to draw attention to the implications of certain
obstetrical practices. While improved screening and inter-
ventionpractices areworthygoals, they only treat the symp-
tom (i.e., immediate violence against women) and not the
cause (i.e., misogyny and oppression). Obstetricians need to
be aware of (and work to change) practices they participate
in that directly and indirectly contribute to violence against
women.
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